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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
In this paper, I will introduce the cognitive theory of emotion by answering two 
questions, what kinds of and how cognitive elements are involved in emotion. Then I 
will reconstruct three of the latest discoveries from neuroscience into arguments 
against the central thesis of the cognitive theory of emotion - cognition necessarily 
involve in emotion. These are the Quick-and-Dirty Route Argument, the Backward 
Masking Argument and the Brain Development Argument. Possible cognitivist 
responses to these arguments will then be discussed. The general strategy of the 
cognitivists is to agree with the reliability of their opponent's empirical findings but 
disagree with the validity of their arguments. Cognitivists carefully point out different 
conceptual con&sions in neuroscientists，arguments which render them invalid. Lastly, 
I will evaluate the dialogue between neuroscientists and cognitivists. I will focus on 
three general arguing formats or strategies and see whether they contribute or hinder 
our understanding of the phenomenon of emotion. These evaluations can be seen as 
rules guiding this kind of dialogue in general. These rules may shed light on the other 
fields of study besides emotion, such as consciousness, memory and imagination. 
Submitted by Wong Muk Yan 
For the degree of Master of Philosophy 




形式包含這些認知要素’介紹認知情緒理論(Cognitive Theory of Emotion)。接著， 
我將以腦科學家三項近代的發現爲基礎，建構三個反對認知情緒理論的論證，它 
們分別爲丘腦捷徑論證(Quick-and-dirty route argument)、前掩蔽論證(Backward 
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The achievements of neuroscience in the twentieth century have convinced 
many people that the problem of understanding the human mind should be handled 
and will be solved by neuroscience in the future. Neuroscientists tell us that in order 
to understand our capacity for cognition, imagination, emotion or consciousness, what 
we need to do is to look into the brain and discover the corresponding neural activities. 
The thousand-year-old philosophical puzzles about different characteristics of our 
mind exist only because our technology is not advanced enough to understand the 
structure of our brain. Philosophical theories of mind should therefore be abandoned 
as they lack empirical foundation and verifiability. Under this trend, it is hard to 
expect genuine cooperation between neuroscientist and philosophers, especially in 
traditional fields such as the study of reasoning or perception, for which both sides 
have a long established stance. 
Emotion is one of the new areas where one can find serious conversation 
between neuroscience and philosophy. Though emotion was regarded as a symbol of 
irrationality throughout philosophical classics, contemporary philosophers have 
emphasized that it has a rational ingredient. They propose a cognitive theory of 
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emotion, suggesting that every emotion necessarily involves a cognitive process. 
When the cognitivists talk about 'every emotion，，it doesn't really mean 'every 
emotion，，but the paradigmatic emotions which have certain intentional content. Most 
of our emotions act towards some intentional object. For example, we are angry about 
John's stealing our car, afraid of the snake and happy about winning the competition. 
For those emotions which have no intentional object at all (we are just feeling angry 
or sad without being angry or sad about any particular thing), cognitivists refer them 
as mood. Whether mood is a kind of emotion is another question. What concerns us 
here is that emotion with intentional content, but not mood, is the target of 
explanation of the cognitive theory of emotion. In other word, the power of cognitive 
theory is to explain the rational aspect of emotion. It is not necessary, however, for it 
to admit that every emotion is rational. Robert Solomon, Martha Nussbaum and Paul 
Griffiths are among the most famous proponents. On the other hand, neuroscientists 
such as Antonio Damasio, Joseph LeDoux, and Jaak Panksepp, argue that cognitive 
theory of emotion cannot be true. They had conducted neuropsychological, 
neurochemical and neurophysiologic experiments which show that emotion can be 
aroused without the involvement of any cognitive process. While the neuroscientists 
challenge that the cognitivists are empirically wrong, cognitivists respond by pointing 
out conceptual confusions in the neuroscientist reasoning and therefore rejecting their 
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conclusions. Their attacks and rebuttal, which have lasted for over twenty years, serve 
as a typical example of the dialogue between neuroscience and philosophy. Through a 
close look at this dialogue, we may understand what makes the two sides disagree 
with each other so fundamentally and their general strategy in rejecting the opponent's 
theory. We can also see what kind of argument may enhance their cooperation and 
what kind tends to trivialize and ruin their conversation. Hopefully we may derive 
some rules to guide conversation between neuroscience and philosophy which will 
make it more fruitful and constructive. In this way, the interdisciplinary study of 
emotion can shed light on the study of other mental phenomena which also require 
cooperation between neuroscience and philosophy. 
In this paper, I am going to introduce the conversation between neuroscience 
and the cognitive theory of emotion and evaluate the general arguing formats of both 
parties. The paper will be divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, I will 
introduce the central themes of the cognitive theory of emotion. Two questions will be 
addressed, namely, how the cognitive processes are involved in emotion and what 
kind of cognitive element is involved. The most convincing version of cognitive 
theory of emotion will be adopted as the standard theory in the following chapter. In 
chapter two，I will present three empirical findings from neuroscience and reconstruct 
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them into formally valid arguments. The three arguments, namely the dirty-and-quick 
route argument, the backward masking argument, and the brain development 
argument, argue that cognition does not necessarily involve in emotion. In chapter 
three, cognitivists' possible rebuttals of each neuroscientists' argument will be 
explained in detail. The general strategy of the philosophers is to challenge that their 
opponents' arguments involve confused uses of concepts such as 'cognition' and 
(emotion，. Thus even though their empirical findings are repeatedly confirmed, their 
claim that emotion can occur without cognition is still unjustified. In chapter four, I 
will evaluate the dialogue between neuroscientists and cognitive in chapter two and 
three. I will focus on three general arguing formats or strategies of both parties. They 
are (l)the fruitless distinction between conceptual questions and empirical questions, 
(2)the status of common sense as the criteria in judging whether a theory is good or 
bad and (3)the redefinitions which should be avoided when explanatory power is 
regarded as the ultimate aim of a theory. The evaluation on these general strategies 
can be seen as the rule will guide the conversation between neuroscience and 
philosophy. I believe that following these rules will make the conversation between 
neuroscience and philosophy, not only the study of emotion but also many other 
mental fields, more fruitful and constructive. 
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Chapter 1: What is a Cognitive Theory of Emotion? 
A cognitive theory of emotion is a theory which claims that emotion is 
necessarily related to some cognitive elements. This definition is so general that it 
seems to tell us nothing about emotion at all Many different theories are compatible 
with this definition. Other theories of emotion, such as the perceptual theory or the 
feeling theory, might agree that emotions have a relationship to cognitive states or 
processes. What we need to do is to find a version of a cognitive theory that has the 
richest explanatory power or captures most of our common understanding of the 
phenomena of emotion. To achieve this aim, we need to narrow down the general 
definition above with specific content. I am going to specify it in two respects, by 
asking how emotion and cognitive elements are related and what kind of cognitive 
elements are involved. Different versions of cognitive theories will be judged 
according to their explanatory power. The most satisfactory one will be chosen and set 
as the target of criticism from neuroscience in chapter two. 
Section 1: How are emotion and cognitive elements related? 
For a cognitive theory, the relation between emotion and cognitive elements 
must be a necessary one. However, in what way are they necessarily related is open to 
discussion. Philosophers mainly see this relation in two different ways. Some of them 
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think that this relation implies an ontological identity, that is, emotion is a cognitive 
element. I call this the strong cognitive theory of emotion. Some think that the relation 
implies only a necessary involvement of the cognitive element in emotion. That is, 
emotion must have a certain cognitive element in order to be emotion. I call this the 
weak cognitive theory of emotion. This distinction between strong and weak 
cognitivism is common among contemporary philosophers. For example, Robert 
Solomon defines cognitive theories of emotion as "ones in which emotions are 
regarded as being either wholly or partially cognition or as being logically or causally 
dependent on cognitions.’“ A wholly cognitive emotion suggests a strong position 
while a partially cognitive emotion suggests a weak one. These two positions will be 
further divided into sub-groups and their corresponding pros and cons discussed in the 
following. 
1.1 Strong cognitive theory of emotion 
The strong cognitive theory of emotion claims that emotion is a cognitive state 
or cognitive process. Philosophers also call this view "pure cognitivism." Matteo 
Mameli defines it as follows. "According to pure cognitivism, emotions are identical 
with the tokening of judgment-like states.”之 Everything other than the cognitive 
process, such as subjective feelings or bodily responses, can only be a precondition or 
1 Robert Solomon, What is an Emotion? Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology, p. 20 
2 Matteo Mameli, “Norms for emotions: biological ftinctions and representational contents", p. 103 
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result of the emotion, but not the emotion itself. This position is strong because 
emotion can be nothing other than cognition. Those elements which we commonly 
include in an emotion are excluded completely by such a position. More interestingly, 
this position is not a product of modem philosophers. It has had its advocators 
throughout the long history of philosophers. The most famous are the Stoics and 
Spinoza. 
1.1.1 Stoicism 
Seneca, a Roman philosopher, statesman, and dramatist, was one of the most 
important representatives of the school of the Stoics. His "On Anger" (De Ira) gives a 
clear example of a strong cognitive theory of emotion. He thought that emotion is all 
about the idea we hold about what would be appropriate to do. He said: 
In order that you may know how emotions (1) begin, or (2) grow, or (3) are carried 
away, (1) the first movement is involuntary like a preparation for emotion and a 
kind of threat. (2) The second movement is accompanied by will, not an obstinate 
one, to the effect that it is appropriate for me to be avenged since I am injured, or it 
is appropriate to be punished since he has committed a crime. (3) The third 
movement is by now uncontrolled, and wills to be avenged, not if it is appropriate 
but come what may, and it has overthrown reason.^  
Seneca explicitly claimed that the second and third movements are emotion, whereas 
3 Seneca, On Anger 
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the first movement is only the "preparation for emotion.，’4 The second movement is 
"accompanied by will" and it judges that “it is appropriate for me to be avenged". 
This “will” that something is "appropriate" seems to be a form of judgment, and thus 
a cognitive process. The third movement is also carried out by will (vult). The 
difference between the second and third movement is that the former is to judge 
whether it is appropriate to feel an emotion and the latter is to judge how to act 
according to the emotion.^ By denying that bodily responses are part of emotion and 
suggesting that judgment is a sufficient condition for emotion, Stoicism is the earliest 
example of a view that emotion is a cognitive process. It is the father of strong 
cognitive theory of emotion. 
1.1.2 Spinoza 
Spinoza's theory of emotion echoes that of the Stoics. His definition of emotion 
was given in his Ethics. "Emotion^ which is called a passivity of the soul, is a 
confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a 
force for existence greater or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind 
is determined to think of one thing rather than another."^ For Spinoza, emotion is an 
4 Seneca insists four time that the first movement is only a "preliminary preludes to emotion" but not 
emotion itself. See On Anger 2.2.5; 2.3.1; 2.3.4; 2.3.5, 
5 Although Seneca said that the third movement "has overthrown reason", we can see that it is the 
instrumental reason overthrows the teleological reason. It is still a reason, so, for Seneca, the third 
movement is still a part of emotion. 
6 Spinoza, Ethics, Part HI 
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idea, though a confused one, about whether bodily responses help preserve or hinder 
our existence. In Spinoza's words, it is about "modifications of the bodily, which 
increase or decrease our active powers.”7 Therefore, bodily responses are only the 
object of emotion. Just as the apple will not be a part of your thinking of the apple, 
these bodily responses cannot be emotion themselves. As Robert Solomon comments, 
Spinoza "sees the emotions as flawed thoughts about the world, misunderstandings."^ 
We are not going to go into the reason why he thought emotion is a flawed or 
confused idea. What we need to point out is that emotion, for Spinoza, is just an idea. 
Hence, he is one of the modem representatives of a strong cognitive theory of 
emotion. 
1.1.3 Rejection of the strong cognitive theory of emotion 
Few contemporary philosophers accept this strong theory anymore.^ To say that 
a cognitive process or element is a sufficient condition for an emotion seems to leave 
many important features of emotion out of consideration. For example, William James 
asked us to imagine an emotion without the corresponding bodily responses. “If we 
fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all 
7 ibid 
8 Robert Solomon, What is an emotion? Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology, p.72 
9 Martha C. Nussbaum is one of the exceptions. However, she stays in the strong position in a very 
cautious way. She said, "This (whether there are necessaiy noncognitive elements) is an extremely 
difficult question, about which we should be open-minded and humble, and prepared to change our 
minds. But I provisionally believe that the answer is that we do not find any such elements." 
(Upheavals ofThought, p. 57) 
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the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, 
no “mind-stuff’ out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and 
neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains.”【。Although it is not an 
argument, we may say that this thought experiment lets us realize that a definition of 
emotion without including bodily responses is counterintuitive. A similar thought 
experiment can also be done on abstracting subjective feeling from an emotion. We 
would again find that an emotion without subjective feeling totally runs against our 
intuition. It is generally agreed among philosophers that four factors are indispensable 
for a definition of emotion, namely bodily responses, subjective feeling, perceptual 
appraisal, and cognitive processing. The real debate is about how these factors are 
related to each other and their specific role in the whole system of emotion. So, a 
strong cognitive theory of emotion which denies all other factors except cognitive 
processes as components of emotion is no longer acceptable. 
1.2 Weak cognitive theories of emotion 
Although we cannot accept that the existence of a certain cognitive element is a 
sufficient condition for having an emotion, if we can argue that it is a necessary 
condition of emotion, we still remain in the zone of cognitive theory. This is the idea 
of the weak cognitive theory of emotion. The theory suggests that emotion involves 
10 William James, What is an Emotion? p.253-254 
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the four main components we mentioned above and the cognitive element is a 
necessary one. It is a weak claim because it doesn't deny that the other components 
can also be necessary. It also puts no restriction on how the cognitive element is 
involved in emotion. Some philosophers define this kind of theory as impure 
cognitivism. As Matteo Mameli says, "According to impure cognitivism, emotions 
involve more than the tokening of judgment-like states. On some impure cognitivist 
theories, emotions have judgment-like states as necessary constituents. On other 
versions, emotions have judgment-like states as necessary concomitants.”" The 
theory is "impure" because it can mix in with other components of emotion while 
retaining its cognitive nature. The definition given by Jesse Prinz well illustrates this 
characteristic of weak cognitive theories of emotion: "Many cognitive theorists 
believe that emotions are thoughts plus some noncognitive component. One might 
define emotions as evaluative judgments plus responses to bodily states." ^ ^ The 
formula 'cognitive element + X，is an open one. Cognitivists claim that no matter how 
we fill in "X," the cognitive theory of emotion still stands. 
Many contemporary philosophers adopt a weak cognitive theory of emotion, 
though they may not state this explicitly. For example, Aaron Ben-Ze'Ev claims that 
emotion involves cognition, evaluation, motivation, and feeling, of which cognition is 
u Matteo Mameli, "Norms for emotions: biological functions and representational contents”，p. 103 
Jesse Prinz, "Emotion, Psychosemantics, and Embodied Appraisal", p.72-73 
11 
a necessary component. He says, "The emotional mode involves the activation of 
certain dispositions and the presence of some actualized states. It also includes the 
operation of various mental capacities and the use of different kinds of intentional 
references. This mode involves cognition, evaluation, motivation, and feeling."^^ 
Whether those components other than cognition are necessary or not remains 
uncertain for Ben-Ze'Ev. The advantage of his theory is that, while asserting the 
necessity of cognition, other generally agreed emotional features can also be 
comfortably included in the definition of emotion. Ronald de Sousa also thinks that a 
definition of emotion cannot be sufficient with cognition alone. He says, “The 
cognitive perspective must also remain incomplete until it can assimilate the lessons 
of the physiological theory. Any cognition, on any but purely immaterialist 
assumptions，must be instantiated by some physiological state of the knower.”^* 
Robert Solomon's theory of emotion was initially a strong cognitivist one. His slogan 
"emotions are judgments" is well known. However, he turned his theory into a weak 
one when he became concerned about the importance of feelings and the body. As he 
explains: 
What has led me to this increasing concern about both the role of the body and 
the nature and role of feelings in emotion is in fact just the suspicion that my own 
cognitive theory had been cut too "thin", that in the pursuit of an alternative to 
the feeling theory I had veered too far in the other direction. I am now commg to 
appreciate that accounting for the feelings (not just sensations) in emotion is not a 
secondary concern and not independent of appreciating the essential role of the 
】3 Aaron Ben-Ze'Ev, "The Logic of Emotions", p. 147 
Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality ofEmotiort’ p.41 
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body in emotional experience” 
Solomon admits that by accepting cognition as a sufficient condition for emotion, 
his theory ‘had been cut too thin'. Feeling and body should not be a secondary 
concern in the study of emotion. Their role could be as important as cognition in an 
emotion. 
A weak cognitive theory of emotion is a flexible theory. It allows a range of 
ingredients other than cognition to be involved. Nor does it restrict the form of 
involvement of these ingredients. These give two explanatory advantages to such a 
theory. First, it can easily match up with our various intuitions about emotion. The 
subjective nature of emotion makes a united intuition about emotional phenomena 
quite unlikely. Everyone has his own feeling or intuition about different emotions. In 
order to capture our different intuitions, it is advantageous for a theory to be open 
ended. Secondly, empirical science expands our understanding of the brain and body 
day after day. The flexibility of a weak cognitive theory of emotion allows it to 
include the latest empirical findings (especially brain-anatomy) without changing its 
cognitive nature. So, I will adopt some version of a weak theory of emotion as the 
standard cognitive theory of emotion in the rest of this essay. 
Section two: what kind of cognitive element is involved? 
15 Robert Solomon, "What is a "Cognitive Theoiy" of the Emotions", Philosophy and the Emotions, 
p. 12 
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While choosing between strong and weak cognitive theory of emotion is out of 
question, it is much more controversial to determine which kind of cognition is 
involved in emotion. The term 'cognition' is so non-informative that possible 
candidates which can fit it are amazing by numerous/^ For example, Solomon and 
Nussbaum suggest that the elements are evaluative judgments. Jerome Neu suggests 
thoughts. Jeffrey Murphy and Kendall Walton suggest beliefs. Some philosophers 
suggest something which is even far from our common understanding of cognition. 
For example, Cheshire Calhoun suggests "seeing as", Robert Roberts suggests 
"construal" and Ronald De Sousa suggests "paradigm scenarios" However, the crux 
of the controversy is not the number of candidates, but their interpretation. The above 
philosophers do not always adopt the ordinary meaning of their chosen cognition 
elements. Instead, their theories are usually accompanied by a new interpretation of 
the cognitive element, which makes the elements flexible enough to include the 
features of other cognitive elements. For example, Solomon's "judgment" is famous 
for its discrepancy with our daily use of "judgment". I am not going to go through all 
candidates here. I choose belief, thoughts, and judgment to discuss because their 
explanatory power is relatively stronger than the other candidates. Besides, they are 
Robert Solomon also mentions this point in "What is a "Cognitive Theory" of the Emotions", 
Philosophy and the Emotions, p.3 
17 This list is given by Solomon, ibid. 
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popular among philosophers and are widely used by non-philosophers. 
2.1 Belief 
Belief is the most commonly accepted cognitive element in emotion. To say that 
emotion necessarily involves belief is to say that in order to be in a certain emotion, 
you must have the corresponding beliefs. For example, in order for you to be angry 
about John's stealing your car, you must believe that John stole your car and that his 
stealing it makes you worse off. If you don't believe that it is John who stole your car, 
we have no reason to think that you are really angry with John. O. H. Green gives 
three advantages of seeing belief as the cognitive element in emotion. 
i. It is not clear how the intentionality of emotions could be explained without 
bringing in beliefs. 
ii. Various emotions can be distinguished from each other in terms of their 
relations to beliefs in a way which is not otherwise possible. 
iii. The connection between emotions and beliefs provides an account of the 
fact that emotions may be rationally justified or unjustified in a cognitive 
dimension, 
The first point illustrates that, as we believe that our emotion is always about 
O, H. Green, The Emotions, p.31-32 15 
something, and our beliefs are always about something too, so the involvement of 
belief explains the intentionality of emotion. The second point illustrates that different 
emotions may share the same physiological response and feeling, but they must 
involve different beliefs. So, belief is a good tool for distinguishing different emotions 
from each other. The third point illustrates that, as we think that emotion can be 
justified or unjustified, and belief shares this characteristic, so the involvement of 
belief in emotion explains the rationale of emotion. These advantages, however, are 
not monopolized by the concept of belief The same advantages are available if we 
substitute for the concept of belief that of thoughts or judgment. So, we would rather 
say that these advantages are of the cognitive theory of emotion in general, not of 
belief as the cognitive element in emotion. However, belief does have some 
disadvantages which are not shared by other candidates. 
Cheshire Calhoun, for instance, holds a rather skeptical view of adopting belief 
as a candidate. She thinks that there is a conceptual gulf between emotion and belief. 
She said; 
On a conceptual map, "belief lies near “responsibility” (we are culpable for our 
beliefs and, hence, there could plausibly be an ethics of belief), "activity" (belief is 
something we do not suffer)，"rationality" (even if some beliefs are irrational, the 
activities of acquiring and holding beliefs occur within our rational, intellectual life), 
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and "judgment" (beliefs have their native home in fully conceptualized and 
articulated judgments). “Emotion,” on the other hand, has a different set of 
conceptual consorts. Although often tied to (causal or constitutive) cognitions, 
emotion nevertheless is paradigmatically passive (it happens to us), involuntary (we 
are not culpable), and a- or ir-rational (it is part of our animal-physical nature and 
often interferes in our rational-intellectual life).^^ 
This long citation comprehensively reveals the difference in our daily use of these 
concepts. As Calhoun says, to say that "emotions are belief is as striking as saying 
that “physiological disturbances are beliefs.”^。 
Beside the conceptual gulf, Calhoun also criticizes that we may not hold the 
corresponding belief for each emotion. Sometimes, our belief and emotion can even 
be contradictory to each other. For example, although we may hold the belief that 
spiders are harmless, we may still feel a chill when we see a spider. Or, although we 
may believe that there is nothing wrong with homosexuality, we may still feel disgust 
when we see two men kissing. These examples seem to suggest that our emotion can 
still be aroused even without the corresponding belief. 
Solomon points out another major problem in adopting belief as the cognitive 
element in emotion. He thinks that beliefs "are necessarily dispositions, but an 
Cheshire Calhoun, "Cognitive Emotions?’’，p.330 
ibid 
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emotion is, at least in part, an experience. A belief as such is never an experience. 
Beliefs are prepositional attitudes while many emotions are not."^^ That is, beliefs 
seem to lack the phenomenal features we think necessary for all kinds of emotion. We 
don't have any special feelings accompanying our beliefs; we just possess them 
calmly. It seems unreasonable to believe that all emotions are so dispositional. 
2.2 Thought 
Some philosophers suggest that the cognitive element in emotion should be a 
thought rather than a belief. The difference between thought and belief is not obvious. 
Jerome Neu, however, sees four advantages of using thought as the candidate. 
i. "Thought can be basic or sophisticated, it need not involve active 
deliberation.，’，22 We would ascribe thought rather than belief to animals or 
children which we think could have emotions. We say that the dog thinks 
there is a bone there rather than the dog believes/judges that there is a bone 
there. 
ii. "Thought can be unconscious...It is crucial to the understanding of 
unconscious emotion ”妇 This is an advantage over judgment rather than 
21 Robert Solomon, "What is a "Cognitive Theory" of the Emotions", Philosophy and the Emotions， 
P.5 




belief because we seldom see the former as unconscious but agree that 
sometimes the latter can be unconscious. 
iii. "The concept of thought allows for both explanatory and phenomenological 
sense. That is, thoughts need not be explicit and self-conscious."24 This is 
an elaboration of point two. To say that thought can be unconscious is an 
explanatory claim rather than a psychoanalytic claim. That is, it allows us to 
explain our behavior to others rather than actually meaning that our brain is 
unaware of our thought. For example, when I say that I thought I had 
returned the book already, it doesn't mean that I am explicitly thinking 
about the idea; it is only an explanation of my behavior, such as my staying 
home and not going anywhere. Neu says, "the explanatory use of the 
concept of thought and thinking is essential to self-understanding and our 
understanding of others." As we explain our behavior in terms of emotion 
similarly, "thought" is a good candidate for allowing the performance of this 
function. 
iv. "Thoughts allow for a contrast between activity and passivity." ^ ^ 
Sometimes we can think about something voluntarily and sometimes some 
thoughts just 'pops' into our head without our consent.26 This feature, Neu 
ibid 
25 ibid 
26 Solomon called the latter "uninvited thought" in "What is a "Cognitive Theory" of the Emotions", 
19 
said, can explain why emotion is sometimes controllable and sometimes 
not. 
Thought is a better candidate than belief because of its looseness in meaning. It could 
both be conscious and unconscious, active and passive. Such flexibility fits the 
diverse phenomena of emotion. 
On the other hand, Solomon gives two criticisms of thoughts as the cognitive 
element. First, he believes that thought is too intellectual, sophisticated, and 
demanding in terms of linguistic ability, articulation, and reflection to apply to all 
emotion. While infants or animals are not intellectually advanced enough to have 
thoughts, they obviously possess certain emotions. However, this criticism sounds 
unconvincing to me. Whether thought or judgment is more intellectual, sophisticated, 
and demanding in linguistic ability depends on one's language habits. Somehow I 
agree with Neu that it seems to over-intellectualize things to say, "the dog judges that 
the bone is buried there" rather than, "the dog thinks that the bone is buried there". I 
don't see a united intuition on which version is more intellectual. Second, Solomon 
says that "thoughts are too episodic for emotions, which often turn out to be enduring 
processes rather than mere episodes."^^ Neither is this criticism convincing. Thoughts 
Philosophy and the Emotions，p.7 
27 Robert Solomon, Not Passion、s Slave: Emotions and Choice, p. 187 
28 Robert Solomon, "What is a "Cognitive Theory" of the Emotions", Philosophy and the Emotions, 
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could become enduring processes as long as the subject is thinking. Just as to judge is 
an episode while judging could be an enduring process. Solomon's criticisms of 
'thought' seem not plausible enough, nor is his own choice, judgment, immune from 
his criticisms. 
2.3 Judgment 
Because of Solomon's influence, judgment is the most popular candidate for the 
cognitive element in emotion. If thought is an echo of Spinoza, then judgment is an 
echo of Stoicism. Solomon says, 
An emotion is a judgment (or a set of judgments), something we do. An emotion is a 
(set of) judgment(s) which constitute our world, our surreality, and its "intentional 
object." An emotion is a basic judgment about our Selves and our place in our world, 
the projection of the values and ideals, structures and mythologies, according to 
which we live and through which we experience our lives.^ ^ 
We can see that Solomon's notion of judgment can include a wide variety of 
things. It is particularly about external objects which affect our well being, as he says, 
the value of these objects to our Selves. Therefore, to say that emotion involves 
judgment necessarily means that when we are angry with John for stealing our car, we 
must have judged that John stole our car and this makes us worse off. The second 
P.7 
Robert Solomon, "A Subjective Theory of the Passions”，Philosophy and The Emotions, p.68 
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judgment here is of major importance. Most cognitivists don't think that the judgment 
involved in emotion is only a factual judgment but an evaluative judgment which 
concerns about well-being. As Nussbaum says, "Emotions, I shall argue, involve 
judgments about important things, judgments in which, appraising an external object 
as salient for our own well-being, we acknowledge our own neediness and 
incompleteness before parts of the world that we do not fully control."^^ 
Similar to Neu, Solomon also claims that flexibility is the most important 
advantage of judgment. He thinks that the features of judgment can be so varied that it 
may cover most of our emotional phenomena. Here is a list Solomon given for the 
similarity of emotion and judgment.^ ^  
i. They are episodic but possibly long-term as well. 
ii. They must span the bridge between conscious and non-conscious 
awareness. 
iii. They must accept as their objects both propositions and perceptions. 
iv. They must be appropriate both in the presence of their objects and in their 
absence. 
V. They must involve appraisals and evaluations without necessarily involving 
30 Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, p. 19 
Robert Solomon, "What is a "Cognitive Theory" of the Emotions", Philosophy and the Emotions, 
p.10-11 
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(or excluding) reflective appraisals and evaluations. 
vi. They must stimulate thoughts and encourage beliefs (as well as being 
founded on beliefs) without themselves being nothing more than a thought 
or belief. 
vii. They must artfully bridge the categories of the voluntary and the 
involuntary. 
Solomon concludes that "thus emotions are like judgments. And emotions necessarily 
involve judgments "32 The characteristic of this list is that judgment could have those 
seemingly opposite features which emotions share. Judgment can be conscious and 
unconscious, episodic and enduring, voluntary and involuntary, with physical things 
as object and with proposition as object, etc. For Solomon, such flexibility can only 
be provided by judgment. 
2.4 Choosing among belief, thought, and judgment 
To choose one of these candidates as the cognitive element in emotion is not 
merely an empirical question. It is also a conceptual question which asks for the right 
usage of the concept. However, what is a 'right usage'? There can be two answers for 
32 ibid 
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this question. First, it is the way we commonly use the concept. Second, it is what 
these concepts implicitly imply and thus is the correct way to use them. I am going to 
argue that, no matter which sense we take as the 'right usage' of the concept of 
emotion, it is difficult to identify which of these candidates corresponds to the "right 
use.” So it is difficult to determine which one should be the cognitive element in 
emotion. 
First, while capturing the features of emotion, the meaning of the cognitive 
element should be within our daily use. That is, we, philosophers and 
non-philosophers both use the term in the same way. If we can give a list on how we 
commonly use the term 'belief, 'thought' and 'judgment', and compare the similarity 
between them and the features of emotion, then we are more ready to pick the right 
cognitive element. However, it is very difficult to draw such a list because we seem to 
have no common usage of these terms. In many occasions, we use these terms 
interchangeably. We can say ‘I believe that the sky is blue' or 'I judge that the sky is 
blue' or 'I think that the sky is blue' and there is no obvious distinction between them. 
As they can be used interchangeably, the advantages, so as the criticisms, of using 
each term are shared by the others. 
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For example, while Green said that 'belief is a good candidate because it can 
explain the intentionality of emotion, help distinguish between different emotions and 
provide the chance for emotion to be justified and unjustified, it seems that even if 
what emotion involves is 'thought' or 'judgment', these three advantages are still 
present. While Calhoun criticized the conceptual gulf and possible contradiction 
between belief and emotion, it seems apparent that the same problems could also 
happen on 'thought' and 'judgment'. On the other hand, while Neu and Solomon both 
emphasize the flexibility of their chosen term, they fail to prove that the other terms 
lack the same flexibility. Both thoughts and judgment can be conscious or 
unconscious, episodic or enduring, happen voluntarily or involuntarily, etc. Some may 
deny the existence of an unconscious judgment or an enduring thought. Other may 
simply affirm their existence by saying that 'we somehow use these terms in that way'. 
Apparently, we have no commonly agreed usage of these terms. The advantages and 
disadvantages of each term, therefore, would be shared by the others, which make our 
choosing among them difficult. 
Even though we may not be able to find the common usage of these three terms, 
this doesn't mean that they cannot be distinguished from each other, especially in 
specialists' use. Some philosophers think that we should find the implicit meaning of 
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each term in order to determine which can really fit the various features of emotion. 
However, under their own interpretation, the implicit meanings of the chosen term are 
usually broad or loose enough to include the features of the other terms. Worse still, 
they may define the other terms as a sub-class of their own term. For example, Neu 
said that "to say that thoughts are essential is to say, for example, that what is most 
distinctive about my anger is the belief (roughly) that someone has caused me 
harm...,，33 In this way, belief is a kind of thought for Neu. David Pugmire said, "the 
type of emotion that an emotion is seems fixed by the relevant thoughts its host has, 
which are often beliefs he accepts or judgments he reaches.,'34 In this way, belief and 
judgment are both a sub-class of thought. To make it more complicated, some 
philosophers suggest that these terms allow an extension of meaning. For example, 
Solomon argues that there is a type of kinaesthetic judgment, that is, judgment made 
by our body. Green suggests an extension of belief. He said, "the epistemic range of 
belief must be expanded with respect to both certainty and modality of 
apprehension...beliefs related to emotions may be conscious or unconscious, 
dispositional or occurrent."^^ Usually, we don't use judgment and belief in this way. 
But these philosophers said that their meaning can be extended as such. With this 
possibility of extension of meaning, the content of 'belief, 'thoughts' and 'judgment' 
33 Jerome Neu, A Tear is an Intellectual Thing, p. 12 
34 David Pugmire, Rediscovering Emotion, p. 8 
35 O. H. Green, The Emotions, p.32 
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can be largely the same. Therefore, we can hardly tell what the implicit meaning of 
these terms is. 
Even though we may not be able to find a generally agreed daily usage or 
implicit meaning of the three terms, it doesn't mean that we must conclude that the 
three terms are just the same and they are equally well as being the cognitive element 
of emotion. The competition of being the best candidate continues among 
philosophers everyday. And I believe that if the discussion continues, so as the 
scientific research on these cognitive process, one day we will be more confident in 
determining one of them as the cognitive element. However, our study on emotion 
needs not stop until that difficult job has been done. As I am going to discuss the 
challenge of neuroscience on cognitive theory, what I need to do is to take a shared 
sense of cognition among the three candidates and show how neuroscience can argue 
that this shared sense of cognition need not exist in emotion. 
So, what is the common component among belief, thought and judgment? They 
are all sophisticated cognitive processes which have certain intentional content. No 
matter we believe, think or judge, we must believe in something, think of something 
or judge about something. This thing need not be a real thing in the world. It can be an 
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event, such as John has stolen my car, or a pure fact of the world, such as it is raining 
outside. In other word, our belief, thought and judgment must all be intended toward 
some 'intentional objects' in the world and these objects become the intentional 
content of our belief, thought and judgment. I will take the sense of cognition in the 
cognitive theory of emotion as 'having intentional content'. I reformulate the basic 
idea of the cognitive theory of emotion as follows: 
1. Paradigmatic emotions have intentional content. 
2. Having intentional content is a good reason to believe that some cognitive 
processes occur. 
3. Paradigmatic emotions involve cognitive process. 
In the next chapter, I am going to show the neuroscientists’ idea that having 
intentional content is not necessary for the occurrence of emotion. Emotion can occur 
without the involvement of this sense of cognition, which is shared by both the 
advocators of cognition as belief, thought and judgment. 
Summary: 
28 
In this chapter, we define cognitive theory of emotion in two aspects - how and 
what kind of cognitive element is involved in emotion. For the first aspect, we have 
no difficulty in choosing between strong and weak cognitive theory of emotion. Due 
to our increasing understanding of the physiological and phenomenological aspect of 
emotion, we cannot accept strong cognitive theory of emotion which suggests that 
cognitive element is the sufficient condition of an emotion. Somehow we think that 
bodily responses and feeling must be involved in emotion. So, we find the weak 
cognitive theory of emotion, which suggests that cognitive element necessarily 
involve in emotion, more convincing. On the other hand, it is much harder for us to 
determine what kind of cognitive element is involved. Belief, thoughts and judgment 
are the mostly advocated candidates. The meanings of all these terms are loosen 
enough to explain the various features of emotion. Unfortunately, we have no 
commonly agreed usage of these terms. So, instead of picking up one of these, I 
determine to pick out the common component of these terms, that is, having 
intentional content, as the basic sense of cognition. In this way, I will take the 
cognitive theory of emotion as claiming that we have good reason to believe that 
emotion necessarily involve cognition because our paradigmatic emotions all have 
intentional content. The challenges from neuroscience in the next chapter are all 
directed at this claim. 
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Chapter 2: Challenges from Neuroscience 
In the last chapter, we argue that the most convincing version of a cognitive 
theory of emotion should only claim that emotion necessarily involve intention 
content, whose existence guarantees the presence of cognitive process. This is such a 
weak claim that its truth seems to be out of question, at least in the field of philosophy. 
However, the recent development of neuroscience tells us that this claim is probably 
false. Studying at different neurological levels, scientists, such as Joseph LeDoux, 
Antonio Damasio, Jaak Panksepp, have rejected intentional content, so as cognition as 
a necessary component of emotion. In this chapter, I am going to present three of the 
latest neuroscience discoveries and modify them into three arguments, namely the 
quick-and-dirty-route argument, the backward masking argument and the brain 
evolution argument. These arguments are based on discoveries in three different 
neurological fields: neurochemistry, neuropsychology, and evolutionary neurology. 
Details of the corresponding experiments will not be presented. What I am going to 
focus on is how neuroscientists construct their arguments against the cognitive theory 
of emotion based on the corresponding empirical findings. The validity of the 
arguments and their possible responses will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Section one: The Quick-and-Dirty-Route Argument 
Joseph LeDoux has done an extensive study on the phenomenon of fear.36 He 
believes that the study of fear can tell us what emotion in general is and how it is 
represented by networks in the brain. The first step in his study was to arouse fear in 
rats through fear conditioning. Fear conditioning is a procedure to make certain things 
which naturally won't arouse our fear to acquire that capacity. First, a rat is exposed to 
a sound which draws its attention. However, when the sound repeats several times, the 
rat ignores the sound. Then, the occurrence of the sound is linked up with a relatively 
mild shock which is a natural trigger of fear for the rat. So, the rat displays alert to the 
sound again. Later, even if the sound is played alone without the accompanying shock, 
the rat still displays the same alert when the shock is present. By association with the 
shock, the sound has become an unnatural trigger of fear. 
After this process of fear conditioning, the rat's fear could be aroused by a 
sound, which alone originally could not scare the rat. The question then is to figure 
out the networks in the brain which make it possible to allow this conditioned sound 
to arouse the fear responses as a result of fear conditioning. For the brain network, the 
36 He chose fear as his tai^ get because of three reasons. First, fear is pervasive. Second, fear plays an 
important role in psychopathology. Third, fear is expressed similarly in humans and other animals. (The 
Emotional Brain, p.129-131) 
37 Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, p. 150 
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starting point and the end point are uncontroversial. They are the ear's connections 
into the brain and the physiological defensive responses, respectively. What interests 
us is the process in the brain between these inputs and outputs. LeDoux identified this 
middle part and discovers that cognition which involves intentional content needs not 
be a necessary part of it. 
He tries to identify the network of fear by an experiment with a tracer injection 
and ablation. A tracer injection is an experiment to discover the natural paths between 
different brain regions (to see which one is under the influence of which one) by the 
injection of a certain chemical. Ablation is a procedure to remove part of the brain to 
see whether the removed part is essential for certain normal functioning of the brain. 
By the injection of a tracer^ ,^ he discovered that the physiological defensive responses, 
the end point in arousal of an emotion, are aroused by the amygdala^^. The question is, 
what processes occur before the amygdala is stimulated? Is cognition necessary to 
activate the amygdala? In the above experiment, LeDoux finds that the tracer went 
through the auditory thalamus and the auditory cortex before entering the amygdala. 
38 The idea of the experiment is rather simple but the details are complicated. LeDoux injects the 
WGA-HRP (wheat germ agglutinin conjugated horseradish peroxidase) in the starting point, the 
auditory thalamus (the initial connection between ear and brain), and let the tracer flow naturally. The 
trace of it can be visualized by the chemical reaction the tracers causes on the neuron. He discovers the 
tracer finally go to amygdala which is known to be responsible for the control of our automatic nervous 
system, (ibid, p. 154-159) 
Defined by Joseph L. Price, "amygdala is a complex of nuclei and specialized cortical areas located 
(in primates) in the rostromedial part of the temporal lobe". Its name means "almond" in Greek and 
Latin because of its shape. 
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To find out whether these parts are necessary in arousing fear, LeDoux experiments 
with ablation. He removes the rats' auditory cortex and discovers that damage to the 
auditory cortex has no effect at all on the conditioning. The rat still freezes'^Vhen the 
sound occurs. Its blood pressure is still high and its heart beating fast. All of these 
shows that fear is still present. However, when he removes the auditory thalamus, all 
the responses we detect before disappear. The rat acts as if nothing has happened. So, 
we can conclude that the auditory thalamus, rather than the auditory cortex, plays a 
necessary part in fear. 
How are the functions of the thalamus and cortex different?"^ ^ I would say that 
they are receptors which detect information in different resolutions. The thalamus 
senses information in a rough way while the cortex handles information in a 
highly-tuned way, which includes reasoning, thinking, and cognition generally. 
LeDoux said, "the Beatle and Rolling Stone will sound the same to the amygdala by 
way of the thalamic projections but quite different by way of the cortical 
projections.，，42 If the information sent from the thalamus to the amygdala is so rough 
that it cannot help us to identify the situation we are dealing with, why is it sent at all? 
The answer is that, although the thalamic system cannot make fine distinctions, it is 
Freezing is one of the most common features of fear among mammals. Its function is to avoid being 
detected, so as the fighting or fleeting comes after it. 
Ibid, p. 162 
42 Ibid, p. 162 
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much faster than the cortical input pathway to the amygdala.斗�In a dangerous 
situation, to react quickly sometimes is more important than to react accurately. "The 
cost of treating a stick as a snake is less, in the long run, than cost of treating a snake 
as a stick."44 If we call the road from the sensory cortex to the amygdala the high 
road or clear road, then, the road from the sensory thalamus to the amygdala is the 
low road or quick-and-dirty road. The existence of such a quick-and-dirty route 
indicates that emotion can be aroused without the involvement of the sensory cortex. 
Consequently, emotion can be aroused without cognition. 
LeDoux says, "the fact that emotional learning can be mediated by pathways 
that bypass the neocortex is intriguing, for it suggests that emotional responses can 
occur without the involvement of the higher processing systems of the brain, systems 
believed to be involved in thinking, reasoning, and consciousness ” 45 I would 
summarize his argument as follows: 
i. The amygdala is responsible for arousing emotional responses (such as 
fear). 
ii. The sensory thalamus can directly activate the amygdala without the 
involvement of the sensory cortex. (By the quick-and-dirty route) 
43 Ibid, p. 163 
Ibid, p. 165 
Ibid, p. 161 
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iii. The sensory cortex is believed to be responsible for our higher cognitive 
powers, such as reasoning, thinking, and calculating, and most importantly, 
the formulation of the intentional content of the corresponding cognitive 
process. 
iv. Therefore, emotions can occur without cognition. 
Section two: Backward masking argument 
Backward masking experiments have been carried out by many neuroscientists. 
The details of the experiments are different, but their aim is the same - to block our 
normal process of cognition, suspend our formation of intentional object and see 
whether emotion can still be aroused. I am going to discuss two such experiments, by 
Ohman and Scares and by Dimberg. 
The basic procedure of backward masking experiments is simple. Two stimuli 
will be showed to the examinee one by one. We call the first one target stimulus and 
the second one masking stimulus. If the interval between the occurrence of the two 
stimuli (the stimulus-onset asynchrony, SOA) is relatively long (on a neural time scale) 
(e.g.,〉100ms), both stimuli may be perceived consciously by the examinee. However, 
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if the SOA is sufficiently short (e.g., <50ms), the target stimulus cannot be recognized 
and only the masking stimulus can be consciously recognized. In this case, we say 
that the target stimulus is backward masked by the masking stimulus.The aim of 
the experiment is to test whether the participants' emotion will be aroused by the 
target stimulus when it is backward masked and cannot be recognized by the 
participants. Different version of this experiments use different things as the target 
stimuli and test whether participants' emotion is aroused in different ways. 
For example, Ohman and Soares"^ ^ used photographs of snakes and spiders as 
the target stimuli and flowers and mushrooms as the masking stimuli. By a 
questionnaire measure, they selected participants who are snake-fearful, spider-fearful 
and unafraid of both (the control group). During the experiment, the photographs of 
snakes and spiders were masked by those of flowers and mushrooms. In other words, 
the participants didn't know that a snake or a spider had been shown to them (because 
they didn't have enough time to recognize the images). The examiners used skin 
conductance responses (SCRs) to test whether the participants' emotions were aroused 
or not. "The results showed elevated skin conductance responses only in fearful 
participants to stimuli that were relevant to their specific fear, even if conscious 
46 Ame Ohman and Stefan Wiens, "The Concept of an Evolved Fear Module and Cognitive Theory of 
Anxiety", Feelings and Emotions - The Amsterdam Symposium, p.63 
47 Ohman and Scares, "Unconscious anxiety": Phobic responses to masked stimuli. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 103, 231-240 
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recognition was prevented by backward masking ”48 
Dimberg conducted a similar experiment with different target stimuli and means 
of checking the emotional status of the participants. His experiment is based on a 
well-founded hypothesis that human "tended to mimic the emotional expression of 
stimulus faces in their facial muscle responses as assessed by electromyography 
(EMG).”49 Thus, while we are exposed to an angry face, our corrugator supercilii 
muscle will increase in activity, and while we are exposed to a happy face, our 
zygomatic major muscle will increase in activity. Dimberg, Thunberg and Elmehed^® 
used photograph of angry face and happy face as the target stimuli and neutral face as 
the masking stimuli. They presented the target stimuli within 30 ms and immediately 
masked them by a 5 second presentation of a neutral face. All participants can only 
recognize the neutral masking face; nevertheless, different facial EMG responses are 
showed according to their different target stimuli. "The masked happy face elicited a 
larger zygomatic response than the neutral or angry face, whereas the masked angry 
face elicited a larger corrugator response than the neutral or happy faces."^^ That is, 
even though the participants cannot recognize the facial expression showed before 
48 Ame Oilman and Stefan Wiens, "The Concept of an Evolved Fear Module and Cognitive Theory of 
Anxiety", Feelings and Emotions - The Amsterdam Symposium, p.64 
49 ibid 
50 Dimberg, Thunberg and Elmehed, "Unconscious facial reactions to emotional facial expressions". 
Psychological Science, 11, 86-89 
Ame Ohman and Stefan Wiens, 'The Concept of an Evolved Fear Module and Cognitive Theory of 
Anxiety', Feelings and Emotions - The Amsterdam Symposium, p.65 
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them, their facial muscle move accordingly. 
I would reconstruct the backward masking argument as follows: 
i. Backward masking limits the time we are in contact with an object that 
triggers emotion. 
ii. This time limit prevents conscious cognition, and the corresponding 
formation of intentional content, from happening. 
iii. However, different physiological responses can still be detected when the 
object is presented with the backward masking. 
iv. These different physiological responses are good indicator of the occurrence 
of fear. 
V. So, fear can still occur without the participation of cognition. 
vi. Therefore, it is not necessary for emotion to involve cognition. 
Section three: The Brain Development Argument 
Just like most parts of our body, our brain has not finished developing when we 
are born. While an adult brain weighs about 1400 grams, a newborn baby's brain 
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weighs only about 360 grams. ^ ^That means we all go through a period when our brain 
has only a part of the functions it develops as we mature into adults. Scientists suggest 
that if they find a period of time when our capacity of cognition has not been 
developed in the brain but we can still experience emotion, then it proves that 
cognition is not necessarily involved in emotion. To test this hypothesis, scientists 
have conducted a wide range of studies on infant emotions and brain development. 
Psychologists have discovered that infants have many kinds of emotion in the 
very early part of their lives. Bridges (citation) claims that at birth the child shows a 
bipolar emotional life. General distress is showed by crying and irritability. General 
pleasure is showed by satiation and attention. At three months, an infant begins to 
develop more specific emotions. Michael Lewis gives a fairly detailed timeslot of the 
emergence of emotions in infants. He suggests that: 
i. By three months, joy emerges when confronted with familiar things or 
events. Sadness also emerges during the withdrawal of positive stimuli. 
ii. Between four and six months, anger emerges when the infant is frustrated. 
iii. Between seven and eight months, fearflilness and surprise emerge. 
iv. After the second half of second year, more sophisticated emotions, such as 
Data from Dekaban, A.S. and Sadowsky, D.，Changes in brain weights during the span of human life: 
relation of brain weights to body heights and body weights, Ann. Neurology, 4:345-356, 1978 
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embarrassment, envy or empathy emerge. 
On the other hand, can the cognitive power of infant correspond to the 
emotional development? Our cognitive functions are mostly carried out by the 
neocortex, especially the frontal lobe (prefrontal cortex)^ .^ J. M. Fuster says, "the 
cognitive development of the child and the adolescent appears to correlate with the 
development of the prefrontal cortex. This correlation is most obvious as we consider 
the evolution—with chronological age~of those cognitive functions of the prefrontal 
cortex that most contribute to intellectual maturation: attention, language, and 
creativity.”54 So, we need to know when the frontal lobe finishes developing in infant 
and to see whether emotion can exist before its completion. 
From the available neuroimaging and morphometric studies】^ we discover that 
the frontal lobe is one of the cortical areas which develop the last in an individual 
development course. Although scientists cannot figure out accurately the time each 
part of the frontal lobe completely developed, they suggest that the fundamental part 
of the frontal lobe cannot finish developing until age of two. Kristin Levine suggests 
53 The frontal lobe is usually fiirther divided into three regions: the medial and anterior cingulate 
region are involved in drive and motivation, the lateral region in working memory and set, and the 
orbital region (to some extent also the medial region) in the inhibitory control of impulses and 
interference. 
54 Joaquin M. Fuster, "Frontal Lobe and Cognitive Development", Journal of Neurocytology 31, 
373-385 (2002) 
Jemigan & Tallal，1990; Pfefferbaum et a I., 1994; Reiss et al., 1996; Giedd et al, 1999 
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that there is a rapid growth in the temporal and frontal lobes between the second and 
sixth year. After age six, however, little or no growth occurs in our brain except the 
frontal lobe. The frontal lobe continues to grow at a moderate speed until age 10, and 
then continues more slowly until age 20. On the other hand, Piaget divides the 
development of our cognitive powers into different stages: 
i. From 2 to 7, child enters a representational stage of extended verbal 
symbolism. 
ii. From 7 to 11，language and behavior become more structured, more 
independent of external stimuli and more creative. 
iii. From 11 to 15 and beyond, the child begins to utilize logical reasoning for 
the construction of hypotheses and for the testing of alternative solutions. 
If we agree that the representational power is one of the most fundamental cognitive 
powers, then our cognitive ability cannot be completed until the age of 2. 
Putting the information about the emergence of emotion and cognition in 
infants together, we find that before the age of two, our cognitive powers are 
relatively incomplete, but several basic emotions have already emerged. That means, 
the existence of these basic emotions does not depend on the existence of a fully 
56 Kristin Levine, "Neuronal Development, Emotion and Thought”，http://www. whale. toA>/my5. html 
J. Piaget (1952), The Origin of Intelligence in Children. 
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developed cognitive power. 
We can summarize the argument from brain development as follows: 
i. Frontal lobe is the core region responsible for our cognitive abilities, so as 
the formation of intentional content of our cognitive process. 
ii. The basic part of the frontal lobe cannot be finished developing until the age 
of two. 
iii. So before the age of two, our cognitive abilities are relatively incomplete. 
iv. However, several basic emotions emerge before the age of two. 
V. So, several basic emotions can emerge even when our cognitive power is 
relatively incomplete. 
Summary: 
While we believe that the weak cognitive power of emotion is flexible enough 
to explain all kind of emotional phenomenon, neuroscientists still think that this 
definition of emotion demands too much. They provide empirical findings at different 
neurological levels (neurochemistry, neuropsychology, etc), all suggesting that even 
when cognition is not present and intentional object cannot be formed, emotion can 
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still occur. The empirical findings in the dirty-route argument, backward masking 
argument and brain development argument had been repeatedly tested so that their 
validity is well guaranteed. However, even if these empirical findings are true, this 
doesn't mean that they can simply overthrow the weak cognitive theory of emotion. In 
the next chapter, we will see how the cognitivists respond to the challenge of these 
three neurological arguments. 
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Chapter 3 ： Possible responses from the cognitive theory of emotion 
Philosophers have always been weak in front of scientific facts. When scientists 
discover that water is H20, the Earth is going around the Sun or quark is the smallest 
particle, philosophers cannot argue for the opposite but to accept it. One may think 
that philosophical theory is no longer significant once scientists discover the 
corresponding fact or the truth. However, this cannot be true because empirical data, 
even if it is repeatedly tested and verified, can never refute a theory. It needs to 
combine with hypothesizes and interpretations of the terminology its question 
concerning about so that a conclusion for or against any theory can be drew. In other 
word, the empirical data must be formulated into an argument in order to refute a 
philosophical theory. Relying on three of the latest neurological data, we have 
formulated three arguments against the cognitive theory of emotion in the last chapter. 
In this chapter, we are going to testify these arguments and see to what extent it can 
threaten the cognitive theory of emotion. 
Section One: Quick-and-Dirty Route Argument 
Let's look at the argument again: 
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i. The amygdala is responsible for arousing emotional responses (such as fear). 
ii. The sensory thalamus can directly activate the amygdala without the 
involvement of the sensory cortex. (By the quick-and-dirty route) 
iii. The sensory cortex is believed to be responsible for our higher cognitive 
powers, such as reasoning, thinking, and calculating, and most importantly, the 
formulation of the intentional content of the corresponding cognitive process. 
iv. Therefore, emotions can occur without cognition. 
Premise ii is founded on the empirical study of neuroanatomy which is difficult 
for philosophers to refute. However，the single fact of the existence of the 
quick-and-dirty route cannot draw the conclusion that emotion can occur without 
cognition. To complete the argument, Premise i and iii are necessary. Philosophers, on 
the other hand, can attack these two premises in order to reject the quick-and-dirty 
route argument. Once these premises are rejected, even though the fact in premise ii is 
proved to be true, the conclusion of the argument cannot be drawn and the cognitive 
theory of emotion is preserved. 
For premise one, cognitivists may argue that emotional response is not equal to 
emotion and so, even if these emotional responses can be aroused by the 
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quick-and-dirty route which bypass cognition, this doesn't mean that emotion can also 
be aroused without the involvement of cognition. For scientists, emotional response is 
equal to a list of bodily responses. These bodily responses can be divided into three 
groups, namely musculoskeletal responses, visceral responses and hormonal 
responses. Using fear as an example, the corresponding musculoskeletal responses 
include contraction of leg muscle, freezing of the whole body; the corresponding 
visceral responses include contraction of the stomach, increasing beating of the heart; 
the corresponding hormonal responses include concentration of blood in the legs, 
release of adrenaline and adrenal steroids. Philosophers call this the identity theory as 
it identifies mind or the phenomena of mind with physical changes in the body. There 
are two obvious problems of this theory. 
First, the identification of certain emotions with physical changes may include 
something which is not that emotion or not even an emotion at all. For example, in the 
above, scientists may think that fear is the shivering of limbs, freezing of body and 
contraction of muscle. However, the bodily responses of an angry person are not so 
much different from these physical responses. In fear and in anger, we both need to 
turn our body into a highly alert mode in order to react as quickly as possible, either 
fighting or fleeting. So, if we look at the bodily responses alone, we can hardly 
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distinguish between anger and fear. On the other hand, the release of adrenaline 
occurs when we feel fear. However, it also occurs when we are under high stress or 
feel sorrow. There is an evolutionary reason behind as the release of adrenaline will 
enhance our memory. In fear, sorrow and high stress, we need to remember the event 
or thing which makes us worse off so as to avoid them in the future. We cannot 
distinguish these three emotional states if we identify fear with the release of 
adrenaline. Worse still, the identification of emotion with bodily changes may lead to 
states we don't view as emotions at all becoming classified as emotions. An 
increasing heat beat may indicate an occurrence of fear. However, it may also indicate 
many other different things. Although the tired swimmer and the excited player on a 
soccer field may have a beating heart, we won't infer that they are feeling fear. Many 
of our daily activities share the same bodily responses with those common emotions 
such as fear, anger or sorrow. However, we do not consider them to be emotions. It is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to find a specific list of bodily responses identifiable 
with a particular emotion. They are usually shared by either other emotions or other 
activities. To identify emotion with certain bodily responses will therefore mix up 
different emotions and make them indistinguishable. Besides, it may include some 
mental or physical phenomena which we don't see as emotion as the member of 
emotion. 
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On the other hand, philosophers may argue that no matter how many bodily 
responses we include as an emotion, it will never be enough because it misses an 
essential factor of emotion, that is, the subjective feeling of emotion. But what is 
subjective feeling of emotion? Peter Goldie believes that these feelings can be 
distinguished into two kinds, "(1) feelings of the condition of one's body, such as the 
feeling of the hairs going up on the back of one's neck; and (2) feelings directed 
towards the object of one's emotion, such as feelings of fear directed towards the 
strange man approaching one in the dark alley "58 We can see that such distinguish 
depends on the difference of the object. Moreover, to be a state of feeling, a state 
needs to be directed toward something, whether our body internally or something in 
the world externally. We call this the intentionality of feeling. Intentionality is 
common among high level mental phenomena. For example, when we hold a belief, 
we must believe about some facts in the world or something we have seen; when we 
have a desire, we must desire about some food or goods. Emotion is a similar state. 
When we are angry, we must be angry about something or somebody. When we are 
sad, we must have something to be sad about. And what constitutes the intentionality 
of emotion is its feeling, which is intentional in nature. That's why philosophers 
58 Peter Goldie, "Emotion, Feeling, and Knowledge of the world", in Thinking about Feeling: 
Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion’ R. Solomon ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
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believe that feeling is an indispensable part of emotion. In comparison to feeling, 
bodily responses can hardly say to be intentional. When our heart beats faster, muscle 
contracts or hormone releases, it is such a pure action that it is not about anything at 
all. In fact, we would rather say it is a reaction which is aroused by something but not 
an action acting towards something. But emotion is intentional. So, we can conclude 
that bodily responses without the intentional feeling cannot be emotion. 
Other than the intentionality, the subjectivity of feeling is also another 
component which cannot be provided by bodily responses. Subjectivity of feeling is 
what we feeling when we are experiencing an emotion. When we are angry, we feel 
the feeling of anger. When we are fear, we feel the feeling of fear. But what these 
feelings really are? It is something hard to tell or describe. We, common people, and 
many philosophers believe that there must be such a feeling accompanying all 
emotions. These feelings are so subjective that we can hardly explain it to anyone else. 
But we all know that everyone has his/her own subjective feeling of emotion. 
Philosophers sometimes call this feeling "qualia", or as T. Nagel describes, "what it is 
like to be". These feelings cannot be reduced to physical state or bodily responses in 
principal because they are a subjective state which is constituted by a first personal 
point of view. That means, even if we discover the most subtle physical changes in 
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our body, we will never find the subjective feeling. Frank Jackson's Knowledge 
Argument and Ned Block's China Brain Argument are the most famous examples in 
arguing for the existence and irreducibility of subjective feeling or say, qualia. I am 
not going to explain these arguments here. What I want to point out is that, as 
subjective feeling is a necessary part of emotion and it cannot be reduced to bodily 
responses, so, bodily responses alone cannot be a sufficient condition of emotion. 
Other than premise one, cognitivists can also attack on premise three, that is, 
the sensory cortex is believed to be responsible for our higher cognitive powers, such 
as reasoning, thinking, and calculating. As it has been discovered and repeatedly 
proved that many of the important cognitive faculty is located in sensory cortex, such 
as the hippocampus which accounts for our long-term memory, transitional cortex 
which accounts for our ability to understand object in context, we cannot deny that 
sensory cortex is responsible for our cognitive power. However, our question is, is 
sensory cortex responsible for all of our cognitive power? Is it too narrow range for 
the neuroscientists to limit the power of cognition within sensory cortex? Does any 
other neural region or even organ in the body also carry out the function of cognition, 
so that, even with the absence of sensory cortex, cognition can still be present? 
Cognitivists' answer is positive. Solomon's kinaesthetic judgment and Jesse Prinz's 
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embodied appraisals serve as the representative examples. 
Kinaesthetic judgment, or the judgments of the body, is an idea that our body 
itself can make judgment similar to, though not as subtle as, our brain.^ ^ That is, 
when we see a lion, our heart beats quicker because the heart judges that it is helpful 
to pump more blood to the foot in order to facilitate escape. When our finger gets near 
a candle, it retreats quickly because the finger judges that a quick retreat will 
minimize the harm. Usually these judgments are made by the brain, but according to 
some cognitivists, our body will make the judgment directly without sending the 
information to the brain and wait for further direction when the situation is very 
urgent and requires an immediate decision or action. Solomon, for example, believes 
that our most basic emotions, such as anger and fear, are constituted by these 
judgments as these emotions serve the old evolutionary function of preserving our life 
in urgent situation. When we are being attacked, we feel angry so that blood will 
concentrate in our hands, hair will bristle, teeth will become visible, etc. All these help 
us threaten the enemy or facilitate the fighting afterward. When we are facing a 
dangerous predator, we feel fear so that blood will concentrate in our feet, the whole 
body will freeze and breathe will be hastened, etc. All these help make a quick 
59 George Downing calls it "bodily micro-practices" and suggests that emotions are to a large extent 
constituted by these. See George Downing, ‘Emotion Theory Revisited,，in Heidegger, Coping, and 
Cognitive Science: a Festschhrift for Hubert Dreyfus, Vol. 2 (M.I.T. Press, 2001)，pp. 245-270 
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fleeting possible. As these situations are too urgent to waste a second, evolution 
prepares us with kinaesthetic judgment which proceeds much faster than judgment by 
brain in order to tackle with these threats. So, our first reason to believe in the 
existence of such judgment is that it serves an important evolutionary function. 
Solomon gives us another reason to believe in the existence of kinaesthetic 
judgment. (Or reason to call these bodily responses as judgment/cognitive process). 
His argument is like this. Knowledge is the product of our cognitive process. A large 
amount of our knowledge is formed by 'knowing-how' instead of 'knowing that'. In 
other word, "many of our most "knowing" responses to the world and the ways in 
which we bring meaning to our world have much more to do with the habits and 
practices we perform than the ways in which we think about and describe the 
world ”6o While the normal "knowing-that" is achieved by cognition made by brain, 
the "knowing-how" is achieved by cognition made by body, that is, kinaesthetic 
judgment. We learn to ride a bicycle, perform a complex sonata, or even baby learns 
how to walk not by reading the corresponding skill written on books, memorizing 
them in the brain and actualize them, but by learning them with our body and let our 
body become familiar with the skill and actualize the skill as a automatic habit. It is 
^ Robert Solomon, "What is a "Cognitive Theory" of the Emotions", Philosophy and the Emotions, pp. 
15 
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hard to analyze these skills into proposition, or say, reduce these "knowing-how" into 
"knowing-that". But they are certainly an important part of our knowledge. So, for 
Solomon, as "knowing-how" is achieved by the judgment of our body, the existence 
of the knowledge of knowing-how serves as a good indicator of the existence of 
kinaesthetic judgment. 
Jesse Prinz suggests that cognition can still be present without the involvement 
of sensory cortex in the form of embodied appraisal. In fact, embodied appraisal is not 
different from Solomon's kinaesthetic judgment. It is also a kind of judgment or 
appraisal made by our body. But Prinz gives us another reason to believe that these 
embodied states (bodily responses) are qualified as appraisal, or say, a cognitive 
process. Prinz suggests that we can define an appraisal as "any mental state that 
represents an organism-environment relation that bears on well-being ”石】So, what 
qualify as such a representation? Does it need to be the representation made by our 
brain - collect information by sensory organs, proceed it with our cortex and reach a 
conclusion? No. Prinz thinks that it demands too much for cognition to occur. He said, 
"To represent appraisal core relational themes, emotions need only occur, reliably, 
when those themes occur."^^ That is, if it is the case that when we face an dangerous 




predator, our leg's muscle will contract, heart beat quicker and sweat comes out, and 
these responses are not a one time coincidence but occurs whenever the dangerous 
predator appears, then these bodily responses are qualified as an appraisal. Even 
though we cannot analyze and discover the content of 'being frightened towards a 
dangerous animal' from the bodily responses, these responses are already qualified as 
representing this content when it occurs reliably towards the frightening object. Prinz 
illustrates this point with an example of smoke detector. He said, "the beep emitted by 
smoke detector might be said to represent "smoke from fire here now," but it does not 
decompose into meaningful sub-beeps. It is semantically primitive.，，63 Prinz thinks 
that as it is acceptable to say that a smoke detector makes an appraisal, it is similarly 
acceptable to say that our body can make appraisal without the help from our brain. 
So, in this way, our emotion can still involve appraisal, which is a kind of cognition, 
even though the sensory cortex is not involved. 
After arguing that the scientists' emotion need not be emotion and the scientists' 
cognition demands too much to be cognition, cognitivists can also challenge the 
reliability of the rat experiment in illustrating human emotion. In chapter two, we 
know that the discovery of dirty-and-quick route is done on a fear-conditioned rat. 
63 ibid 
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The existence of the route is confirmed when the rat's sensory cortex is removed and 
the rat's fear responses are still present. However, one must bear in mind that the fear 
of rat is very different from the fear of human. As rat is non-linguistic animal, it 
cannot form many of the complex beliefs we human being share. And many of our 
emotions are possible only when several beliefs are hold. For example, one may be 
fear about the examination. To have such a fear, it is supposed that we must know 
what an examination is, what it's significance to one's future or how much time one 
still have for preparation. For a non-linguistic animal like rat, it is not possible to hold 
such complicated belief, if not the relation among these beliefs. By pointing out the 
difference between rat and human being, my purpose is not to deny the existence of 
such a dirty-and-quick route in human being. Due to the similar structure of the brain 
of rat and human being, it is very possible that human brain also contain such route. 
However, same hardware needs not guarantee same result. With different 
"accessories", such as our linguistic power, memory or imagination, rat cannot share 
most of human emotion. So, by using rat as the subject of this experiment, scientists 
should limit the validity of their result on those common emotions, like those very 
basic fear or anger, between rat and human being. And one must bear in mind that, 
when comparing to the complexity of human emotion, the amount of these common 
emotions are rare. 
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Section two: Backward masking argument 
Let's look at the argument again: 
i. Backward masking limits the time we are in contact with an object that triggers 
emotion. 
ii. This time limit prevents cognition, so as the corresponding intentional content, 
from happening. 
iii. However, different physiological responses can still be detected when the 
object is presented with the backward masking. 
iv. These different physiological responses are good indicator of the occurrence of 
fear. 
V. So, fear can still occur without the participation of cognition, 
vi. Therefore, it is not necessary for emotion to involve cognition. 
For premise iv, we had already given our reasons why the physiological responses 
need not equal to emotion or even act as a good indicator of emotion in the last 
section. So, I am not going to repeat it here. Premise i is a fact which can hardly be 
refuted. Our target, therefore, is premise ii. Why a time limit can prevent cognition 
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from happening? What condition is cognition need to meet in order to be cognition 
and how long is the time needed to meet these conditions? The proponent of the 
backward masking argument may argue that cognition doesn't exist in the experiment 
because of the following two reasons: 
1. In the experiment, the subject is not conscious of the masked stimulus. Cognition 
cannot occur if we are not conscious of the object of cognition 
2. In the experiment, the subject is not conscious of the perception of the masked 
stimulus. When cognition occurs, one must be conscious of the process. So, the 
perception of which we are not conscious cannot be cognition 
If one of the above statements is true, we have to accept that there is no 
cognition in the backward masking experiment. However, I am going to argue that all 
of these statements are probably false. Before I give my reasons, we need to define 
what means by "conscious o f , or say, "unconscious o f . Anthony G. Greenwald 
thinks that there are two senses of unconscious, namely, attentionless sense of 
unconscious and verbally unreportable sense of unconscious. 64 He describes the 
attentionless sense of unconscious as follows. "If consciousness is interpreted as the 
^ Anthony G . Greenwald, "New Look 3 - Unconscious Cognition Reclaimed", American 
Psychologist, June 1992, pp. 766- 779 
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selective aspect of attention, then one is unconscious of unaware of stimuli that 
impinge on receptors but fall outside the metaphorical spotlight of selective 
attention"65 This sense of unconscious is supported generally among scientists 
(James 1890; Pillsbury, 1908; Kahneman, 1973; Posner & Boies, 1971). We would all 
agree that we cannot pay attention on everything as the information in the world is 
just too much for us to handle. So, evolution prepares us a brain which will 
concentrate on information which is crucial to our survival only. Consciousness, in 
this sense, is the attention we paid on those selected information in the world. For 
information we do not pay attention to, we say that we are unconscious of it. For 
verbally unreportable sense of unconscious, Greenwald describes it as follows. "If 
consciousness is interpreted as the ability to report experience validly, then one is 
unconscious or unaware of the occurrence, cause, or other attributes of attended 
objects, events, or actions when one cannot report those properties validly."^^ In this 
sense, we are attended to the object but we cannot report verbally what we perceived. 
This may be caused by misperception of the object, failure of memory or deficiency 
of verbal capacity. The unbalance of our linguistic power and our perception accounts 
for the possibility of this sense of unconscious. For the backward masking experiment, 




caused by a time limit of perception of the object, it is clear that the subject does not 
have enough time to pay attention on the masked stimuli. Though the subject also 
cannot verbally report what he/she saw, this is due to the lack of attention, that is, the 
first sense of unconscious. So, I will interpret the two reasons given by the opponents 
of cognitivism as unattending to the object and unattending to the cognition process 
itself. 
Let's look at the first reason again. 'In the experiment, the subject is not 
conscious of the masked stimulus. Cognition cannot occur if we are not conscious of 
the object of cognition. ‘ This cannot be true because cognition can still occur even if 
we are not attended to the object of cognition. Our daily experience and the 
experiment of selective listening support this idea. When we are driving a car on a 
familiar road, we can pay most of our attention on the conversation with friends, 
partial attention on the radio, but still keep the car on the right track, prevent rubbish 
on the road, and slower the car when another car cuts into our lane. We pay no 
attention on the road condition. And if we are asked about what we have seen on the 
road afterward, we could barely tell. All we can tell is the content of conversation 
with our friend in detail. But still, our successful driving, reaching the destination in 
time and not crashing into another car or road block, shows that we have made a lot of 
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judgments during the journey though we haven't paid attention on all these objects on 
the road. In fact, many of our daily routine works are done with this unconscious 
judgment. When our body is too familiarized with what we are doing, we don't need 
to pay attention on the object in order to make the corresponding judgment. 
Other than our everyday experience, the experiment of selective listening also 
illustrate that cognition can be made even without awareness of the object. In 
selective listening, the subjects are required to pay attention to and report information 
from a primary channel, while the information of a secondary channel is exposing to 
the subject without the subject paying attention to. Afterward, the subject will be 
tested indirectly for the effect of the secondary channel on him. The effect is the most 
obvious when analysis is focus on the pitch, loudness and spatial location of sound in 
the secondary channel. (Cherry, 1953^ )^ This may give us the impression that, though 
the subject is affected by these information, the processing of these information is not 
sophisticated enough to be counted as cognition. However, the story doesn't end here. 
Different scientists discover that many forms of meaningful word can also affect and 
attract the attention of the subject, such as one's name (Moray, 1959^ )^, a word that is 
67 Cherry, E. C. (1953). "Some experiments on the recognition of speech, with one and two ears". 
Journal of the Acoustical Society ofAmerica, 25,975-979. 
68 Moray, N. ( 19 5 9). "Attention in dichotic listening: Affective cues and the influence of 
instructions". Quarterly Journal of Experimental P^ho logy , 11，56-60. 
60 
expected on the basic of the primary channel (Treisman, 1960^ )^, or a word that has 
been associated with electric shock (Dawson & Schell, 1982'^ °).'^ ^ The processing of 
one's name, though not under one attention, is surely one kind of cognition. 
Greenwald concludes as follows. "These findings strongly suggest that the secondary 
channel is analyzed at a level involving at least minimal aspects of word meaning." 
In a word, the experiment proves that cognition is still possible even without one's 
attention on the object of cognition. 
The second reason arguing for the lack of cognition in backward masking 
experiment: 'In the experiment, the subject is not conscious of the perception of the 
masked stimulus. When cognition occurs, one must be conscious of the process. So, 
the perception of which we are not conscious cannot be cognition' This also cannot be 
true because cognition can still exist without our attention or awareness on the process 
of cognition. There is a strong evolutionary reason for the existence of such cognition. 
The fiinction of our visceral organ serves as a good analogy in illustrating the point. 
Our heart bumps blood throughout the body from time to time. However, we would 
69 Treisman, A. M. (I960). "Contextual cues in selective listening". Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 12, 242-248 
70 Dawson, M. D，& Schdl，A. M. (1982). "Electrodermal responses to attended and nonattended 
significant stimuli during dichotic listening". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 8, 315-324. 
” The listed is given by Greenwald 
72 Anthony G . Greenwald, "New Look 3 - Unconscious Cognition Reclaimed", American 
Psychologist, June 1992，pp. 766- 779 
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not pay attention to this fact normally. So far as it runs at an acceptable pace, we don't 
need to monitor its functioning. Similar process includes digestion of stomach or 
detoxification of liver. We don't pay attention to these processes because, first, they 
can proceed successfully without our attention; second, there is more important thing 
for us to pay attention to. When we are attacked by a lion, our attention should be put 
on the lion and the route of fleeting but not our beating heart and numb limbs. 
Similarly, our brain process millions of information everyday, from the every detail of 
external environment to the internal processing of our visceral organ. Some 
information is more crucial to our survival and some are not. For those which are not, 
evolution has developed the processing of them into an automatic process which does 
not need to run or monitor by our attention. But still, they are a process of information 
and should be counted as cognition. Simply put, cognition can exist without paying 
our attention on the process of it because evolution has prepared it (part of the less 
complex cognition) into an automatic process. 
On the other hand, the studying of blindsight also shows that cognition can exist 
without the subject paying attention to the cognitive process. Basileios Kroustallis 
defines blindsight as ‘the ability of patients with an impaired visual cortex to perform 
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visually in their blind field without acknowledging that performance.'^^ Blindsight 
patients are those whose left or right visual cortex is impaired. If the left visual cortex 
is impaired, then the patient is blind in the corresponding right visual field. In the 
experiment of blindsight, the patient is showed a picture or word in their blind field. 
Then he/she will be asked to point to the object. The patient insists that he/she could 
not see the object therefore not possible for him/her to point at it. Afterward, two 
objects (one of them has been showed in the patient's blind view before) are showed 
in front of the patient. The researchers then ask the patient which one he/she has seen 
just now. The patient reports that he/she sees nothing. Then the researchers force the 
patient to make a guess between the two objects. The responses from the patient are 
evaluated and researchers find that they can choose the object showed in their blind 
field "well above chance limit"^^ though the patient still insist that he/she has not 
seen that object before. Kroustallis explains this unusual phenomenon by pointing out 
that there are two visual streams, the ventral stream and dorsal stream, in our brain. 
While the ventral stream "permit the formation of perceptual and cognitive 
representation which embody the enduring characteristics of objects and their 
significance", the dorsal stream "capture instead the instantaneous and egocentric 




features of objects, mediate the control of goal-directed actions.”？�Although the 
ventral stream, which is controlled by visual cortex, of the patient is impaired, their 
dorsal stream, which is mainly controlled by the lateral geniculate nurcleus (LGN) is 
intact. Therefore, the blindsight patient can still pick up the right object in their blind 
zone well above chance. And because the dorsal stream cannot be conscious of by the 
subject, therefore, the subject will not be aware of this cognitive process when the 
process is carrying out. This example of blindsight shows that cognition can still be 
carried out without the subject's awareness of the cognitive process. 
Section three: Brain Development Argument 
Let's look at the argument again 
i. Frontal lobe is the core region responsible for our cognitive abilities, including the 
formation of intentional content of our cognitive process. 
ii. The basic part of the frontal lobe cannot be finished developing until the age of 
two. 
iii. So before the age of two, our cognitive abilities are relatively incomplete. 
iv. However, several basic emotions emerge before the age of two. 
75 Milner & Goodale，1995 
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V. So, several basic emotions can emerge even when our cognitive power is 
relatively incomplete. 
Compare to the two arguments above, this argument is even more open to 
objection. We can challenge this argument in three respects. First, the conclusion (v) 
is not enough to overthrow the core of cognitive theory of emotion. A relatively 
incomplete cognitive power is different from a totally lack of cognitive power. The 
cognitivists may argue that even though the cognitive power of infant is relatively 
incomplete, this limited cognitive power is already good enough for it to generate 
some basic emotions. When they claim that emotion necessarily involve cognition, 
this cognition needs not be sophisticated as ‘I am hungry but I have neither the money 
to buy some food from supermarket nor the strength to go there', but simply 'I am 
hungry'. Infant is capable of making the latter. That's why it can have the emotion of 
angry or sorrow. As a matter of fact, the prefrontal lobe of infant is far from complete. 
Fuster said that the prefrontal lobe is responsible for the maturation of our intellectual 
power, including attention, creativity and language. But are these three factors 
necessary for all emotions? While an infant surely possesses the ability of attention 
(at least some irrefutable attention on its mother), the other two factors seems 
unnecessary for those basic emotions like fear or anger. Admittedly, it is impossible to 
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be embarrassing or jealous if we cannot think linguistically and creatively. However, 
it is generally agree that many non-linguistic animals can possess some basic 
emotions which are essentials for the maintenance of survival. In short, although 
infant has not fully developed their prefrontal lobe, it can still possess certain 
cognitive powers before the completion of prefrontal lobe. These limited cognitive 
powers, though not able to generate highly sophisticated emotions, are enough to 
generate those basic emotions like fear and anger. So, the incomplete prefrontal lobe 
of infant cannot prove that emotion can exist without the involvement of any 
cognition. 
Second, frontal lobe may not represent our full cognitive power. In fact, the 
idea that cognitive functions can be localized in particular parts of the brain is deeply 
problematic. Since nineteenth century, phrenology has tried to divide the brain into 
different sections and assign different functions to them. It is natural to analyze our 
brain in this way just as we assign different functions to our visceral organs. They 
thought that as the heart is for pumping blood and lung for inhalation and exhalation, 
our brain can also be divided exclusively into different parts which are responsible for 
our mental powers, such as memory, imagination, judgment, etc. However, this 
cannot be true because each mental process is a system which is represented by 
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different regions of the brain and the same brain regions can also work for different 
mental systems. As LeDoux said, 'Functions are mediated by interconnected system 
of brain regions working together rather than by individual areas working in 
isolation，.76 Take vision as an example. We usually say that our ability to see is the 
function of the visual cortex. If the visual cortex is impaired, we will be blind. It's 
true but this doesn't mean that vision is localized in the visual cortex. There are many 
different regions in the brain which are also responsible for our vision, such as the 
visual thalamus, brain stem. These regions contribute to our ability to see in their 
unique ways that their removal will also turn us blind. As our ability to see is a 
process of information which involves different stages, "damage anywhere along the 
path from the eye through the final stages of processing in the visual cortex can 
disrupt vision, just as removal of any link breaks a c h a i n . T h e more sophisticate 
the mental process we are talking, the more complicate is its system, and the more 
brain regions are involved in the system. Cognition is one of the most complicate 
systems in our brain. So, we have no reason to believe that it is fully represented by 
one brain regions, the frontal lobe, only. So, for the infant, even if the frontal lobe has 
not begun to develop, we have no reason to believe that no cognition can occur as 
other part of the infant's brain, such as the temporal lobe and parietal lobe, has been 
76 J. LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, pp，77 
77 Ibid, pp, 76 
67 
fully developed. In short, even we agree that infant's frontal lobe is totally absent, it 
doesn't totally rule out the possibility of the existence of cognition as we have no 
reason to believe that cognition is totally localized in the frontal lobe. 
Lastly, infant as the object of experiment is not unproblematic. Just as the rats 
in the dirty-and-quick route argument, young babies are also non-linguistic animal 
with a limited cognitive power. Certainly babies have certain basic emotions like 
anger and fear. However, does the study of infant's anger and fear reveal what an 
adult human being's anger and fear really are? To what extent does the emotion of a 
non-linguistic animal illustrate the emotion of a linguistic animal? These are 
questions for which scientists cannot escape. As I have already illustrated this point in 
section one, I am not going to repeat it here. 
Summary: 
In this chapter, we have reviewed several possible responses from the 
cognitivists on the challenge from neuroscience. For the dirty-and-quick route 
argument, cognitivists argue that the neuroscientists' conception of 'emotion' and 
'cognition' is problematic. While the former cannot be equal to a list of bodily 
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responses, the latter can be carried out by some lower level apparatus such as sensory 
thalamus or even our body. That's why it is not clear whether the bodily responses 
aroused by the sensory thalamus (but not sensory cortex) are emotion or whether this 
thalamus arousal cannot be counted as a cognition. For the backward masking 
argument, cognitivists argue that neuroscientists demand too much for a cognition to 
be carried out. Neither the content of cognition nor the cognitive process itself had to 
be conscious of in order for cognition to occur. That's why even though the subject 
doesn't have enough time to be conscious of the object in the experiment, this cannot 
rule out the possibility that cognition is still occurring. For the brain development 
argument, cognitivists argue that neuroscientists' localization of our cognitive power 
in frontal lobe is problematic. Even though the frontal lobe has not been completely 
developed, this doesn't mean that we have no cognitive power at all till then. That's 
why even though infant's frontal lobe is relatively incompletely, we cannot conclude 
that their emotion involves no cognitive power at all. We can see that most of the 
cognitivists' responses rely on neuroscientists' confusion of concept. They argue that 
their opponents' definition of the key terms (cognition and emotion) is either too 
broad or too narrow according to the 'common usage' of the terms. Certainly, this 
'common usage' is defined by the cognitivists. So, we may further ask, is this general 
strategy of attacking the opponents' definition from our commonsense a valid one? 
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Why cognitivists', or say, philosophers' interpretation of commonsense should be 
considered as an authoritative one? In the next chapter, we will evaluate this general 
strategy of the cognitivists and see whether it will contribute or hinder our 
understanding of the phenomenon of emotion. 
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Chapter four: Reflection on the conversation between neurosdence 
and philosophy 
In the last two chapters, we have seen how neuroscientists attack the main 
thesis of the cognitive theory and how cognitivists may respond to their opponents' 
arguments. I point out that one of the general strategies of philosophers' rebuttal is to 
argue that neuroscientists use the key concepts in a confused way. In this chapter, I am 
going to evaluate the dialogue between these positions and see what we can learn 
from it. However, whether the cognitivists are successful in defending the cognitive 
theory of emotion, or the neuroscientists' arguments are strong enough to overthrow a 
philosophical theory is too soon to be determined. Their conversation about the nature 
of emotion continues everyday and I believe it is premature to draw a conclusion. 
What I would like to do is to evaluate the general format or strategy of their 
arguments and counterarguments and see whether they contribute or hinder our 
understanding of the phenomenon of emotion. It is also important to notice that this 
kind of dialogue is very common among neuroscientists and philosophers. Other than 
the study of emotion, we can find similar conversations in the study of cognition, 
memory, and consciousness, among other areas. If we have a better understanding of 
the general format of the argument and counterargument in the dialogue about the 
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nature of emotion, this may lead us to a better understanding of the relation between 
neuroscience and philosophy in general and shed light on other issues besides emotion. 
In the following, I will evaluate three general argument formats or strategies and to 
see whether they should be promoted or avoided in our future interdisciplinary study 
between neuroscience and philosophy. 
Section one: Conceptual questions versus empirical questions 
Many of the interdisciplinary studies between philosophy and neuroscience 
doom to fail at the very beginning because both sides firmly believe that they are 
handling a problem independent from the other and so need no help from the other. 
Their general strategy is as follows. Before actually giving one's argument, they 
define the problem as the unique problem of their own domain, or their domain as the 
own legitimate source of solution to this kind of problem. More modest positions 
claim that they are handling the problem in their unique way and they are providing 
one of the solutions to this problem. Both of these are in fact trying to draw out their 
own independent boundary, which is immune from the challenge of the other domains. 
This immunity, however, is only an unverified assumption of both parties. From the 
dialogues through chapter one to three, it is clear that neither of them can 
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satisfactorily complete its job without the help of the other. I am going to explain the 
reason as the following. Many people generally see science as handling empirical 
questions and philosophy conceptual questions. While scientists observe and explain 
natural phenomena, philosophers check whether the language we used to describe the 
world or express ourselves is logically valid and makes sense. The aims of these two 
endeavors seem distinct. Neither project seems to need help from the other, nor can 
they pose a challenge to the other. This sharp distinction, however, becomes obscure 
when it comes to neuroscience. The subject of neuroscience is not some clearly 
observable objects in the world, but the mental phenomena and capacity of human 
beings. When we study objects in the world, we can identify one and analyze it in 
whatever way we want. However, when neuroscientists try to identify a single mental 
phenomenon and localize it in the brain, their approach becomes suspect from the 
start. Mental phenomena are not physical items we can simply go out and pick up. We 
believe in their existence not because we can actually see or touch them, but because 
the psychological concepts we used seem to successfully describe and explain what is 
happening in our mind. But just as we must know what the term 'water' refers to in 
the world before we can analyze it as H20, we must know what 'cognition', 
'emotion', 'feeling', etc, refer to before we can further explain how they are carried 
out by the brain. In this way, empirical research is unavoidably mixed with conceptual 
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questions. 
Before neuroscientists decide which part of the brain is responsible for which 
mental phenomena, they must have decided what these concepts of mental 
phenomena refer to (as a group of bodily responses, as subjective feeling, as a 
function of our brain, etc). These generally become hidden assumptions of the 
neuroscientists; however, they are not always unquestionable. Philosophers' job, then, 
is to check whether these assumptions make sense or not. To determine whether they 
do is a conceptual question because it is we, the concept-users, who decide what these 
mental concepts refer to. Concepts do not get their content directly from nature. 
Scientists can analyze every detail of an apple. However, they cannot understand why 
an apple is called 'apple' and not 'orange' through empirical experiments. In Chapter 
Two, when we reconstructed neuroscientists' findings as arguments, we saw that they 
made assumptions about the meaning and reference of central terms such as 
'cognition' and 'emotion'. For example, neuroscientists must assume that cognition can 
only be carried out by sensory cortex but not sensory thalamus in order to reach the 
conclusion of the dirty-and-quick route argument. In the brain development argument, 
neuroscientists must assume that cognition gets start only till the completion of frontal 
lobe. And in Chapter Three, these assumptions became the focus of cognitivists' 
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rebuttals. Whether the cognitivists' attack is correct or not, they raise legitimate 
questions about the validity of these concepts. The neuroscientists have a 
responsibility to answer these challenges and explain why their usage of these terms is 
reasonable. On the other hand, neither can philosophers' conceptual analysis be free 
from challenges by empirical science. One of the strongest factors in determining 
whether a concept makes sense or not is if it can depict the real world accurately. We 
do not categorize whales as a kind of fish mainly because as a matter of fact they are 
not a kind of fish, but mammals. We determine the reference of water as H20 because 
that is its real chemical composition. Of course our usage of concepts is not always so 
simple. There are cases for which empirical science doesn't have the final call. 
Nevertheless, philosophers should agree that it is always legitimate and in fact 
common in the history of philosophy that philosophical concepts are changed by 
empirical findings. Only when we admit that conceptual question and empirical 
question cannot be distinguished from each other sharply, and the researches of 
philosophy and neuroscience are not immune from the challenge of each other, could 
we expect the cooperation of philosophy and neuroscience and a promising progress 
in the understanding of our mental phenomenon. 
Section Two: Compelltion for the authoritative interpretation of common 
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understanding 
In the above, we say that the research of neuroscience and philosophy cannot be 
distinguished from each other and their interacting point lies on the interpretation of 
the meaning or definition of the key terms. So, the problem is, how to choose a better 
interpretation of the key terms? In order to make the comparison possible, they must 
have the corresponding criterion in determining whether an interpretation is right or 
wrong (at least more reasonable or less reasonable). The common understanding^^ of 
the term is a commonly accepted criterion. The general strategy here of both sides in 
the debate is as follows. They tend to claim that their interpretation reflects how the 
term generally understood and argue that the other party has violated the common 
understanding of the term. For example, neuroscientists may reject Solomon's 
kinaesthetic judgment by claiming that we only refer to judgment as a function of our 
brain but not our body. Cognitivists may also reject neuroscientists' idea that bodily 
responses are equivalent to emotions by claiming that no one agrees that a nerve 
stimulus is equivalent to fear. In other words, they compete to give an authoritative 
interpretation of the commonsense use of terms, by which their opponents' use is 
78 I would like to emphasis that it is the understanding of the terms, but not common sense on the 
terms which acts as the criterion here. The former refer to general understanding of the professional 
who are studying in this field while the latter usually refer to how we layman use the terms in daily life. 
The criterion in judging whether an interpretation of the terms is good or not is a sophisticated matter 
which demands a criteria from the former, even though none will deny that the former is usually 
established on the latter. 
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illegitimate. 
However, from the conversation between neuroscience and philosophy in case 
of the cognitive theory of emotion, we can see that the case is not that simple. 
Although both claim that they start from the common understanding of mental terms, 
neither really holds that the folk usage of these terms is beyond challenge. Their 
reasons for distrusting the common understanding, however, are very different. 
Philosophers believe that common understanding is not always reliable because it 
may involve conceptual confusions that are difficult to notice. When the relation 
between different concepts is too complicated, we can easily confuse the reference 
and meaning of the concepts. A famous example is the problem of category mistakes 
suggested by Gibert Ryle^^. On the other hand, neuroscientists believe that common 
understanding can be false because of our lack of the corresponding knowledge. We 
once used 'whale' to mean a kind of fish. With progress in biological taxonomy, we 
now understand that this usage is wrong, because whales are in fact a kind of mammal. 
One of the aims of neuroscience, as with any science, is to correct or redefine our folk 
usage of mental terms in light of empirical discoveries. 
79 Gibert Ryle suggests that if one said, ‘I have already seen the hall, the dormitory, the classroom and 
the gymnasium, but I still haven't seen the university yet’，he has committed the categorical mistake. 
The concept of 'university' and the concept of 'hall, dormitory, etc’ are in different levels. They cannot 
be compared with another in this way. Misplacement of category is a common conceptual confusion in 
our daily life. 
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Both philosophy and neuroscience need to start from common understanding to 
identify the problem they will work on. If their usage of the mental terms is too far 
from our common understanding of them, we cannot understand what questions they 
are going to tackle. For example, when they come to the study of emotion, they must 
at first adopt what we lay people think about emotion: something about personal 
feeling and body reactions. However, after their own research gets underway, they 
may have their own reasons for violating or modifying commonsense usage. And, 
most important, their reasons, in principle, may be convincing enough that we will 
agree to violate our initial common understanding of the terms. So, merely departing 
from common understanding is not a reason for rejecting either sort of view. Certainly, 
either side can disagree with the particular reasons for the other's transgression of 
common understanding. However, that a view violates common understanding alone 
is not a telling criticism. This mistake is especially common among philosophers. For 
example, cognitivists argue that mere bodily responses cannot be emotion, just as we 
would not call our quick retreating hand when being burned a state of fear. 
Neuroscientists may reply that we would not call that reaction fear in daily life. 
However, our habit of using ‘fear, can be changed if the change can help us 
understand and explain the phenomenon of fear better. We have no reason to stick 
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with folk usage if a new discovery illustrates that it is incorrect'. 
Section three: Explanatory power as the final aim of both philosophical and 
neuroscience,s theory 
If common understanding is not a good criterion in judging which sides' 
interpretation of the key terms should be accepted, then what is? I believe that the 
final aim of both philosophy and neuroscience is to explain the phenomena but not 
defending common sense. So, explanatory power can be adopted as a criterion in 
judging whether a definition or redefinition of a key term is worthwhile or not. Only 
when a definition or redefinition can help us understand the mental phenomena better 
should it be encouraged. In the following, I will evaluate two ways of defining a term 
(of both sides of the debate) and explains why these formats should be avoided. 
First, we should not redefine a mental term in a way which will make the 
meaning of the term trivial. Solomon's concept of judgment serves as an illustrative 
example. He says, 'the judgments that I claim are constitutive of emotion may be 
non-propositional and bodily as well as prepositional and articulate, and they may 
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further become reflective and self-conscious.，如 He also claims that there are 
objectless judgments and unconscious judgments. So, if judgment can really be 
prepositional and non-propositional, bodily and articulate, conscious and unconscious, 
with object and without object, then how could it be possible to distinguish it from 
other mental concepts? Under this definition, belief, desire, hope, a pain on the finger, 
our moving legs while walking, or a sigh after examination can all be "judgments." If 
the definition of judgment is that broad, of course emotion consists of judgment and 
of course the cognitive theory of emotion is right. However, does this definition help 
us understand emotion? Does it tell us to what extent emotion is rational and irrational? 
Does it help us explain why certain emotions can be conscious and others not, other 
than saying that because the former contains a conscious judgment and the latter an 
unconscious judgment? Solomon's theory is an example of trying to explain 
phenomena by building it into a definition of a mental term. However, this broadening 
of a definition makes it include everything, finally turning it trivial. Such a 
redefinition explains nothing about the mental of emotion. Therefore, it should be 
avoided. 
Second, we should not redefine mental terms in a way which makes mental 
80 Robert C. Solomon, "What is a “Cognitive Theory" of the Emotions", Philosophy and the Emotions. 
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phenomena inexplicable. A phenomenon is no longer explainable when it by 
definition cannot be observed or studied. For example, when we define 'ghost' as 
something which no one can see or touch or sense by all means, then there is no way 
to explain scientifically what a 'ghost' is. The most we can do is to understand the 
concept of ‘ghost’. But the explanation of a concept is different from a scientific 
explanation of the referent of a concept. When cognitivists reject neuroscientists' 
assumption that emotion is equivalent to or indicated by corresponding bodily 
responses, they point out that subjective feeling is a necessary part of emotion and it 
can never be reduced to bodily responses. If we further inquire about the nature of 
subjective feelings, we may discover that cognitivists tend to turn this concept into 
one which may render emotional phenomena inexplicable. According to some 
philosophers, subjective feelings, a kind of qualia, are a mental state which can only 
be observed by oneself but not the others objectively. Through introspection, we know 
our feeling of anger, fear or happy. This introspection is only available to me. Nobody 
can share my introspection. Therefore, it is not possible for the others to observe my 
subjective feeling directly. If the others want to understand my subjective feeling, the 
most they can do is to rely on my verbal report. One may say that the concept of 
subjective feeling is different from those we reject above. Comparing to the concept 
of ghost, at least subjective feeling is not totally unobservable. Everybody can observe 
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his own subjective feeling with his own introspection, even though there is no way to 
observe other's subjective feeling objectively. Wittgenstein's private language 
argument argues that there can be no private language because if the language is 
private, there will be no criterion to judge whether the language is used correctly or 
not, and a language cannot be a language without this criterion. Similarly, but not 
pushing it that far, subjective feeling allows us with no criterion to judge whether the 
other is feeling the same way as us. We have no way to discover whether my anger is 
equal to or more/less intense than your anger. Even though subjective feeling really 
exists, the definition of it prevents us from understanding it, so as emotion, objectively. 
The most we can talk about is 'my anger', ‘my fear', but not 'the anger', 'the fear'. 
As our target of explanation is the latter but not the former, the redefinition of terms 
which makes the mental phenomenon unobservable objectively should be avoided. 
Summary: 
Cross-disciplinary conversation is always a challenging task. For a conversation 
to be fruitful and illustrative, but not only an announcement of one's own doctrine 
again and again, there should be some guidelines for all participating parties to follow. 
Just as a ball game without rules can only end up in chaos, a conversation without 
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mutually accepted guideline can never enhance our understanding of the other party 
so as the subject of study. From the conversation between neuroscience and 
cognitivists in chapter two and three, we evaluate three general strategies of both 
party and we have the following conclusion. First, to define the problem of emotion as 
a pure conceptual question or empirical question is an unwarranted assumption. The 
explanation of mental phenomenon cannot be completed by either neuroscience or 
philosophy because empirical questions and conceptual questions are mixed together 
in this kind of conversation. Second, common understanding is not a good criterion in 
judging whether one's interpretation of key terms should be accepted or not because 
both parties may have legitimate reasons to violate common sense. Third, as the aim 
of both parties and their conversation is to enhance our understanding of the mental 
phenomenon, explanatory power should be adopted as the criterion in judging the 
validity of their interpretation of key terms. Taking explanatory power as the criterion, 
definition or redefinition of terms which will make the meaning of the term trivial or 
inexplicable is not encouraged. We can see these evaluations as the guideline of the 
conversation between neuroscience and philosophy. Certainly, there can be hundreds 
of guideline beside these three. However, I believe that these are the most basic one. 
No matter we are studying emotion, cognitive power or consciousness, if 
neuroscientists and philosophers follow these guidelines, at least they can starting 
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understanding each other but not sticking to one's position and simply ignore the 
others' as nonsense. 
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Conclusion: 
Interdisciplinary study between neuroscience and philosophy is a tough task. 
Even though both aim at the explanation of mental phenomena, their reasoning, 
method of research and even vocabulary are drastically different from each other. 
Their conversation is mainly found in form of competition rather than cooperation. 
Distrust in the other's way of study roots deeply in both parties. While neuroscientists 
may find philosophers omitting the real world and constructing their own fancy and 
unverifiable theory in cafe, philosophers may find neuroscientists twisting up the 
meaning of our concepts, defining them in their own favorite way and then claim to 
discover 'the phenomenon' in some suspicious experiments. Without mutual 
understanding which breaks their distrust and general rules which guides their 
conversation, one could hardly expect a genuine and constructive cooperation 
between them. 
I have presented in this paper a typical conversation between neuroscience and 
philosophy. Over the topic of emotion, neuroscientists cites latest empirical discovery 
to reject the cognitivists' claim that emotion necessarily involve cognition. On the 
other hand, cognitivists carefijlly analyze their opponents' usage of the concept 
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‘cognition’ and 'emotion' and try to point out how they are used in a confijsed way. 
Finally, I evaluate three general arguing strategies in the conversation which could in 
turn act as the guiding principles for all kinds of interdisciplinary project between 
neuroscience and philosophy. Neuroscientists should realize that their empirical 
finding alone can never overthrow a philosophical theory. It must be reconstructed 
into an argument with the addition of other premises. And in this way, it can no longer 
prevent itself from the conceptual questions philosophers are dealing with. On the 
other hand, philosophers should be more open-minded when neuroscientists redefine 
some key terms in a way which violate our common understanding of them. They 
should realize that neuroscientists are as ready as philosophers in declaring that 
common understanding could be problematic. The neuroscientists' proposal may 
usually sound weird at the beginning, but none should be hastened to conclude that 
these concepts cannot be used in this way until one learns about the explanatory 
power of them. Lastly, as the aim of both philosophy and neuroscience is to explain 
our mental phenomena, neither of them should redefine the key terms in a way which 
will make the explanation impossible. Solomon's judgment, which includes every 
characteristic of all mental phenomena, and ‘qualia’，which is by definition 
unobservable, are decent examples which should be avoided by both sides. 
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If we all agree that the explanation of our mental phenomena can never be 
satisfactory without the joint effort of neuroscience and philosophy, and we also agree 
that their cooperation is still at the very rudimentary level, then we will agree that the 
general principles above may offer some constructive guiding to the interdisciplinary 
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